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Pension Policy Reforms in Germany 
 
 
 
 
 
Foreword 
 
Christine Ante has written this policy report as part of assignments for the Elective Course on “A New 
Social Europe?” organized by Stein Kuhnle for the Master of Public Policy program at the Hertie School 
of Governance during the Fall semester 2007.  
 
The aim of the course was to look at what is happening at the European (EU) level and at commonalities 
and variations at the national level in today’s European welfare states. The purpose of the course was to 
give students a deeper understanding of European welfare state development, to study the role of the EU 
for national developments, and to study to what extent examples of national reforms can be understood as 
responses to exogenous or endogenous economic, social and political challenges. 
 
As one assignment students were asked to write about – and characterize - reforms in different social 
policy fields – family-, health-, labour market- and pension policy - within one of the following countries, 
representing different types of welfare states or ‘welfare regimes’: Denmark, Germany, Poland and the 
United Kingdom. The general research question given was: Is there a new politics of welfare in the 
(selected) European countries? Is there a change of path of social policy or welfare state development? 
Students were asked to relate to conceptualizations of types of welfare states and concepts or theories of 
policy change; to report on major recent reforms; to discuss the contents and implications of reforms in 
light of theoretical conceptualizations; and, if possible, discuss why and how reforms came about.  
Thirteen students participated in the course, and reports were written on labour market reforms and 
pension reforms in all four countries; on family policy reforms in Germany, Poland and the UK; and on 
health policy in Poland and the UK. The course was very much an interactive, collective undertaking and 
the other students participating and actively taking part in discussions, and thus contributing to the 
improvement of single policy reports were: Veselina Angelova, Simon Bruhn, Nevena Gavalyugova, 
Ariane Götz, Henry Haaker, Nevena Ivanović, Jan Landmann, Diana Mirza Grisco, Ruth Obermann, 
Diana Ognyanova, Julie Ren, and Lyubomir Todorakov. 
 
Stein Kuhnle 
Professor of Comparative Social Policy, HSoG Course Instructor/Convener 
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Abstract 
 
This paper states that German pension policies have taken a new path. After describing the major 
characteristics of the German post-war pension system, the paper will analyse the major reforms 
since 1989 and the way they changed and challenged the main characteristics of the pension 
system. As a next step, the paper will revise the reforms in several different aspects. Firstly it will 
argue that the way of decision-making changed: the role of the social partners and of inter-party 
consensus-building diminished; the actors’ constellation became more pluralistic. Secondly, 
policy change will be discussed in light of Peter Hall’s concept, concluding that a policy 
paradigm change took place - incrementally. Thirdly, against the background of Esping-
Andersen’s welfare typologies, it will argue that there is an initial shift (especially in ideas) from 
a conservative pension model towards a liberal one.  
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1. Introduction 
 
This paper analyses the pension policy reforms in Germany with a special emphasis on the 
reform conducted in 2000/2001 by the Schröder government. After giving an overview of the 
post-war pension system, I will evaluate the pension policies of the Kohl government – most 
importantly the 1997 reform –, and the 2001 reform undertaken by the Schröder government. I 
will discuss the main features of the reform and their impact on the post-war pension system. In 
chapter 5, I will have a deeper look at the way these pension reforms changed decision-making 
and review them in light of the concept of social learning provided by Peter Hall (Hall 1993) and 
against the background of Esping-Andersen’s welfare typology (Esping-Andersen 1990). Finally, 
I will reconsider my analysis in terms of the question: Have German pension policies taken a new 
path of welfare?  
 
2.  The Post-War Pension System 
The existence of the German pension system goes back as far as to Bismarckian times, when in 
1889 a law on invalidity and old-age insurance established a statutory pension scheme 
(Gesetzliche Rentenversicherung). After World War II the Adenauer government decided in 1957 
to replace the then-existing fully funded scheme with an insurance-based pay-as-you-go system 
(PAYG), in which contributions are not capitalized, but immediately employed to cover current 
pension payments. Because of the world wars there were hardly savings stocked, and the PAYG 
system was able to provide all pensioners with rather high pensions immediately instead of 
leaving pensioners to themselves. Thus, it was of tremendous political advantage for the 
government, especially among older voters. However, criticism already then pointed to its 
lacking long-term financial security, which Adenauer rejected with his famous sentence “people 
will always have children” – a momentous misconception. In 1972, the Brandt government 
expanded the statutory pension scheme: possibilities for claiming pension payments were 
extended, pensions for low income earners increased, early retirement was facilitated and the 
retirement age was lowered (Aust et al. 2002). 
 
At the end of the 1990s, the German pension system consisted of three pillars. The first pillar, the 
statutory pension scheme, was most decisive for financial retirement safeguarding, survivors’, 
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and disability benefits: it provided for more than 80 % of all retirement income and included all 
gainfully employed (Aust et al. 2002, Scharpf 2000, Schmähl 2003). The emphasis on the 
statutory system is linked to the constitutional principle of “social justice” (Sozialstaatsprinzip), 
from which social security for the aged can be deducted (Andersen et al. 2003).1 Company based 
pension schemes constituted a second pillar covering about 2/3 of all employees (more men than 
women) with invested balances summing up to 250,000 million Deutsche Mark (Whiteside 
2006). Contributions as well as the involvement of individual employers and employees varied 
significantly; in addition, coverage differed in different branches (Aust et al. 2002, Schmähl 
2003). As a third pillar, voluntary capital funded savings were available on the free market. Here, 
a great variety of types exists. These are sometimes tax-privileged, such as  the risk pooling life 
insurances. The second and the third pillar each contributed 10 % to the overall pension 
expenditures at the end of the 1990s (Schmähl 2003).  
 
Four further factors were characteristic for the German pension system at the end of the 1990s. 
(1) The major goal of the system was to guarantee the maintenance of the attained standard of 
living (Lebensstandardsicherung). The replacement rate2 was at about 70 % and survivor 
benefits were comparatively high. Furthermore, pensions were highly dependent upon the 
individual employment record; there was a strong link between contributions and benefits and 
individual claims were accumulated. (2) Another important feature of the German pension system 
was the shared financing of the first and the second pillar by employers and employees 
(“paritätische Finanzierung”). Social partners played an important role; moreover, they operated 
the pension insurance, although the government regulated rates and key parameters. Federal 
grants have traditionally been comparatively small3 (Aust et al. 2002, Ginn et al. 2007). (3) 
Thirdly, the model was closely related to the male breadwinner, the premise being that the 
working man is in gainful employment liable to insurance deductions whereas the woman is a 
housewife. (4) Finally, Germans developed a high confidence in the post-war pensions system 
and believed in its capability to guarantee living standard-maintaining retirement incomes. This 
                                                 
1 The principle of „social justice“ (Sozialstaatsprinzip) is codified in article 20 of the constitution and as such 
unchangeable. It sets the foundations for a “social market economy” and codifies the obligation of the state to work 
towards a security of existence and social security for all its citizens and towards social justice between them. Social 
security for the aged – as one group among the others - can therefore be deducted from this principle.  
2 The replacement rate is defined as the replacement of the average net income conducted in the working life in 
percentage (Ginn et al. 2007:21) 
3 For a more detailed discussion see p. 9 
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can also be attributed to the fact that it provided pensioners with comparatively high incomes 
(Schmähl 2003, Hinrichs 2006, Aust et al. 2002).  
                                                
 
However, the system already then had severe financial problems due to two major reasons: an 
ageing society and decreasing competitiveness of the Rhenish welfare capitalism. Low birth rates 
and higher life expectations caused increases in expenditures (Aust et al. 2002). Furthermore, 
official economic assumptions had been overly optimistic. The Rhenish welfare capitalism 
caused growing (structural) unemployment and a low employment rate of both women and men. 
Hence, revenues of the insurance system decreased. Moreover, the pension system and other non-
wage labour costs burdened especially low wage jobs, hereby damaging less productive services - 
a field with low employment rates in Germany (Scharpf 2000). Also, since the system relied on 
permanent full-time employment relationships, the process of de-standardisation on labour 
caused additional problems (Aust et. al 2002). Already in 1996, the OECD calculated the 
“estimates of financial liabilities in Public Pension Programmes 1995-2030”, according to which 
German public pension payments measured in percentage of GDP were supposed to increase 
from 11.1 % in 1995 to 16.5 % in 2030 and the tax/GDP ratio required to keep the net debt 
constant was estimated to increase from 2.8 in 1995 to 9.7 in 2030. The financial problems 
trapped Germany in a circulus vitiosus: Increasing social contributions rates would further 
damage the economy, decrease employment and increase benefit costs (Natali et al. 2004; 
Scharpf 2002).  
 
3.   Pension Reforms by the Kohl Government 
“One thing is sure: pensions.” This CDU slogan from 1986 shows that pension reforms have been 
prominent on the political agenda in the 1980s and 1990s. After the election of the Kohl 
government in 1982, several small reforms were carried out;4 only in 1989 a major reform was 
undertaken. While the 1972 reform expanded the statutory pension scheme, the goal of the 1989 
reform was financial sustainability combined with keeping a high replacement rate. Although at 
that point several (sometimes radical) options were discussed, the government opted for system-
immanent reforms. A new indexation of annual pension adjustments decreased real pension 
 
4 These several smaller reforms aimed for example at a more similar treatment of widows and widowers, introduced 
introducing child credits because of reasons of justice with respect to mothers, and decreased survivors’ pensions for 
those with high pension levels.  
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claims, and several policy measures aimed at increasing the retirement age to 65 years, but were 
of rather modest nature (Aust et al. 2002). “The cumulative effect of the various reform elements 
was expected to facilitate a contribution rate of 26.9 per cent instead of 36.4 per cent in 2030” 
(Hinrichs 2006: 5). These measures were expected to slow down the rise of social contributions 
to “only” 26.9 % instead of 36.4 % in 2030 (Ginn et al. 2007, Hinrichs 2006). In addition, 
policies to advance child rearing were significantly enhanced and the federal grant was increased 
(Aust et al. 2002). The Kohl government was convinced that after this reform, no further 
measures would be necessary until 2010 (Hinrichs 2006).  
 
However, the financial problems of the system increased even more with rising unemployment. 
High transfers out of the pension insurance were directed at Eastern Germany after German 
unification – which could not be foreseen even in 1989 when the last pension reform was carried 
out. Contributions rose. In light of the upcoming federal elections and in order to show its ability 
to act, the 1997 reform conducted by the Kohl government introduced measures of financial 
consolidation, focusing on stable contribution rates. Most importantly, a “demographic factor” 
was introduced in the pension formula in order to take into account increased life expectations; as 
a consequence, the replacement rate would decrease from 70 % in 1997 to 64 % in 2030. 
Eligibility criteria for disability pensions were tightened. Again, the federal grant and credits for 
child rearing were extended (Aust et al 2002). Still, the reforms already pointed at the 
institutional failure of the pension insurance system. These policies were in sharp contrast to  
earlier declarations that pensions were secured.  
 
The reforms undertaken by the Kohl government were system-immanent. Still, two factors of the 
second reform stand out: Firstly, while the 1989 reform emphasised both financial sustainability 
and the preservation of the high replacement rate (and therefore guaranteed the maintenance of 
the attained standard of living), the second reform broke with the latter characteristic of the 
German pension scheme (Aust et al 2002). Secondly, the way of decision-making changed: 
Before the second reform, the traditional governance mode of consensus-building required the 
two big parties to give a say to their respective counterpart in pension policy reforms. In 1997, 
SPD opposed the reforms, and the CDU implemented them anyway (Aust et al. 2002).  
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4.   The Schröder Government and The 2001 Reform 
In line with its opposition to the last CDU reform, the red-green coalition elected in 1998 
rescinded major parts of the 1997 reform, including the demographic factor (which at that point 
had not yet come into effect) and increased the coverage of the statutory pension scheme. Once 
again the federal grant was raised, which, in spite of the other measures increasing the 
expenditures of the system, enabled a lowering of the contribution rate from 20.3 % to 19.3 % 
(Aust et al. 2002).  
 
Then, to the surprise of many, reformers inside the SPD took over and changed the course of the 
coalition – most decisively in fiscal, labour market and pension policies. In 1999, the Minister of 
Labour, Walter Riester, proposed a fundamental pension policy reform, which was controversial 
within and outside the coalition (Aust et al. 2002). Following the traditional pattern of consensus-
building in the field of pensions, the SPD consulted with the CDU, and also with the social 
partners. In May 2000, Riester proposed a new package. One major element was the introduction 
of a voluntary private pension pillar5, which however was not made compulsory due to the 
critique of the trade unions and the left – as a consequence, fiscal incentives for private pensions 
were strengthened. From the year 2008 onwards, contributions of up to 4 % of the individual 
gross income will be subsidised and there will be further incentives and top-ons for low income 
earners and parents. Another 4 % can be made subject to company based pension schemes – these 
subsidies increased due to concessions to the trade unions. Furthermore, the plan to introduce a 
minimum pension was dropped because of critique from the CDU; in return means-testing for 
pensioners relying on social assistance became less strict. Other major proposals were kept: the 
reform package included a change in survivors’ pensions and a further reduction of replacement 
rates by an indexation of pensions to prices in 2000 and 2001, a fixation of pension insurance 
contributions (at a maximum of 20 % in 2030 and 22 % in 2030) and another increase of the 
federal grant. The trade unions agreed to the new pension plans after several other concessions, 
but the CDU still opposed the reforms. However, somehow it was unable to organise a blockade 
in the second chamber, the Bundesrat (Aust et al. 2002; Hinrichs 2006). 
                                                 
5 The new credit reserve fundings are located in the private sector; they consist of individually and privately 
conducted old-age provisions subsidised by the state with bonuses, tax advantages and reductions of social insurance 
payments (“Riester Rente”). In order to be eligible for state subsidies, the private pension plans have to fulfill several 
conditions, such as the guarantee of a nominal payment of the amount paid in and the payment of the accumulated 
capital at the point of retirement or inability to work.  
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 The 2001 pension reform is a major and decisive reform because of several reasons. Most 
importantly, (1) the strengthening of the third pillar is a major change in the balance between the 
three pillars (Aust et al. 2002). The burden of social risk partly shifted from the state to the 
individual. Although 4 % are by no means an indication for a radical substantial shift, it is a break 
with ideas. Combined with the fact that pension entitlements and replacement rates will decrease 
to 67 % in 2030 due to the new pension indexation formula, this is (2) a fundamental change 
away from the principle that the statutory pension aims at maintaining living standards – which in 
the future will only be possible with additional private or company-based pension schemes. 
Furthermore, (3) the fixation of contribution rates made the benefit level instead of the 
contributions the dependent factor (Hinrichs 2006). (4) The cut in survivors’ pensions reveals a 
turn away from the male breadwinner model. (4) What is also important is the break with the 
paritätisches System: employees alone pay for the third pillar without similar grants by the 
employers (Aust et. al 2002). Finally, (5) in all reforms since 1989, the size of the tax-financed 
grants increased. The share rose from 21 % in 1991 to 33 % in 2006 (Hinrichs 2006). The federal 
budget subsidised the pension insurance with 77 billion Euros in 2006; including neither the 
further 55 billion Euros of additional subsidies for the pension insurance (Das Parlament 2006), 
nor subsidies for private pension savings, which are expected to be 11 billion Euros in 2008 
(Lamping and Rüb 2001).  
 
Since 2001, further pension reforms were carried out. Two commissions, most prominently the 
“Rürup-Commission”, composed of experts and social partners, proposed further deductions in 
the replacement rates, changes of pension taxation and an increase of the age at retirement up to 
67 years. Major parts of these proposals have been implemented up to now.  
 
5.   The Pension Policy Reforms Reconsidered 
So far, I have shown the history of the German pensions system and its main features, analysed 
the Kohl reforms and the 2001 reform, and illustrated their main characteristics and the way they 
changed the post-war pension system postulates. I will now turn to analyzing the reforms (1) 
according to the underlying governance patterns and decision-making procedures, (2) in light of 
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Peter Hall’s (1993) theory on policy change, and (3) against the background of Esping-Andersens 
“Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism” (1990).  
 
 
5.1.   A Changed Way of Decision-Making 
The way of decision-making changed in several aspects. A major difference lies in the interaction 
between the two big parties in Germany. The tradition of inter-party consensus-building as a 
prerequisite for reforms was disregarded first by the CDU in 1997 and then by the SPD reforms 
in 2000. This reciprocal opposition to policy proposals has had important consequences. As the 
institutional context of welfare state retrenchment differs from the one of welfare state extension, 
politicians try to avoid blaming for cutbacks in order to get re-elected (Nye 2003). In case of 
inter-party policy consensus, voters have no alternatives to the government’s reform agenda. 
When this consensus is not present anymore, it becomes more important to take stakeholders and 
electoral groups into account.  
 
Yet another significant pattern of governance changed: according to Trampusch (2005), social 
partners became less important. ”Because the social partners declined the offer of the government 
to reform the social insurance system with a concensus, politicians now reform the social state” 
(Trampusch 2005:19).6 All in all, in Trampusch’s opinion the red-green coalition led to a more 
active government and to a party system acting more autonomously from social partners. In 
addition, since the 1990s, the old-style “social politicians” (Trampusch 2003), who were strongly 
connected to the social partners, are no longer decisive for social policies: now, “party 
politicians”, who prioritise on their political career, took over (Trampusch 2003).7 
                                                 
6 In her analysis, Trampusch draws not only upon the 2001 reform, but also on the time afterwards and the Rürup 
Commission 
7 On the basis of an analysis of curricula vitae of the MPs in the Parliamentary Committee for Labour and Social 
Affairs from 1972-2002, Trampusch (2003) analyses the connections between the MPs and social partners, social 
interest groups and institutions of social administration. In the 1970s and 1980s the connection was strong; since the 
1990s this linkage became less important for CDU deputies in general and for SPD politicians in their connection 
with unions, workers’ councils and socio-economic interest groups. In both parties, a professionalisation of the 
politicians can be observed. Before, social politicians (who had strong connections to social partners, civil society 
and social institutions) together with leaders from the social partners and experts from the ministries were decisive 
for social policies. Now, party politicians do not represent social interests or social interest groups, but prioritise on 
their political careers; their occupation is not in social policies, but in politics. For Trampusch, this implies a change 
of the elite and is the first sign for a beginning de-corporatisation – a weakening of the corporatistic linkage between 
state and social partners.   
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 The actor constellation was moreover diversified by the introduction of new actors in the arena of 
pension policy decision-making: new think tanks, “party politicians”, the finance minister (due to 
the accepted need for a sustainable federal budget), and the finance industry (because of the 
highly strengthened third pillar) (Schmähl 2003). Also, media coverage increased, emphasising 
the lack of financial sustainability. Not only was the corporatist interaction fractured as described 
above, but also the whole policy process became more complex and disputed (Nye 2003).  
 
5.2.   A Change of Policy Paradigm? 
In his concept for policy change, Peter Hall (Hall 1993) analyses the policymaking process as 
social learning,8 in which ideas play an important role. For a policy change to occur, three 
features are central: previous policies, key agents for the learning process – on most occasions 
either experts or politicians –, and the capacity of states to act autonomously from societal 
pressure. According to Hall, the policy-making process includes the following three variables: 
goals in a particular policy field, techniques and instruments used to achieve these goals, and 
precise settings of these instruments. Change can occur in three different ways. (1) A first order 
change is characterized by incrementalism, satisficing and routinised decision-making, as a result 
of which the instrument settings change. (2) In the course of a second order change, policy and 
their settings are altered; strategic action takes place, but the hierarchy of goals behind the 
politics are not changed. The latter is only established in a (3) paradigm change, when a radical 
change inherits periodic discontinuities in policy. A policy paradigm is defined by Hall as an 
interpretative “framework embedded in terminology through which policymakers communicate 
about their work” (Hall 1993: 280). Since they are usually not questioned, policy paradigms are 
highly influential. Paradigm changes usually occur for sociological reasons and “involve the 
accumulation of anomalies, experimentation with new forms of policy, and contest between 
competing paradigms” (Hall 1993: 280). For its maintenance of the new paradigm, authority is 
required.  
 
                                                 
8 He defines social learning as „a deliberate attempt to adjust the goals or techniques of policy in response to past 
experience and new information. Learning is indicated when policy changes occur as the result of such a process”  
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In Germany, changes occurred incrementally: although the institutional failure of the pension 
system could be foreseen already in the 1990s, measures were system-immanent and only 
gradually and incrementally questioned the system itself. The first reform of the Kohl 
government fulfils all the characteristics of a first order change. The 1997 reform constituted an 
initial change of ideas; especially because the demographic factor questioned the postulate of the 
maintenance of the acquired standard of living. Hinrichs (2006) classifies the reform as a second 
order change. The first reform of the red-green government in 1998 then retracted these changes. 
On the contrary, the 2001 reform broke with a number of postulates of the former pension 
system. Also the discourse changed towards a focus on financial sustainability, demographic 
change, globalisation, and the so-called concept of “intergenerational justice” (Ginn et al. 2007). 
Incrementally and with every reform – not just with one -, the balance between social 
contribution levels, the federal grant, and the replacement rate was changed. The balance between 
the three pillars and between private and public security shifted - even if the subsidised private 
safeguarding pillar is only to make up 4 %, the shift in the nature of the system is persistent. All 
major characteristics of the post-war pension system were challenged. As Natali et al. (2004) 
point out, this occurred together with a questioning of fundamental assumptions of the 
conservative pension model  - constant economic growth, full employment, family stability, low 
female work participation. In the words of Hall, accumulations of policy failures occur. 
 
Hall described a policy paradigm as a comprehensive framework for a certain policy field and a 
paradigm change as the re-balancing of social goals and ideas to the disadvantage of others. The 
analysis above shows that this did happen in the field of pension policies in Germany. Therefore, 
one could argue that a change of the policy paradigm took place. However, it did not happen with 
only one reform, but in a continuous, long-term process. 
 
5.3.   From a Conservative towards a Liberal Pension System? 
Esping-Andersen’s famous study on the “three worlds of capitalism” (Esping-Andersen 1990) 
typologised welfare states on the basis of their outcomes, focussing on de-commodification, 
stratification and employment. The diverging outcomes developed in a history of path 
dependencies based on different political circumstances and class interactions. Germany is 
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labeled a “conservative-catholic/etatist” welfare state.9 The pension system of a conservative 
welfare state is described by the following characteristics: a moderate level of 
decommodification, income maintenance related to the former position on the labour market for 
reasons of status maintenance, corporatism and etatism as governance models and a slender 
solidarity based on corporatism. It is oriented towards the “male breadwinner model”: men earn 
the family wage whereas women take care of housework, children and eventually of handicapped 
or aged family members. In the pension system, high survivor’s benefits are a consequence – as a 
result, divorced women have the highest risk of poverty at old age (Aust et al. 2002, Esping-
Andersen et al. 2002, Scharpf 2000, Ginn et al. 2007). 
  
The role, the view on, and the degree of decommodification were changed substantially with the 
introduction of the third pension pillar in the 2001 pension reforms. Many authors see this as a 
first step towards a totally new pension system, in which a minimum pension is financed by the 
statutory insurance system and additional allowances have to be attained by private pension 
schemes (Aust et al. 2004, Scharpf 2000, Natali 2004). Then, the introduction of a (small) third 
pillar would imply a first small step towards a totally new public – private division: a shift 
towards a liberal model of welfare. The changed stratification also clearly points not only to a 
move away from the conservative welfare state, but clearly towards the direction of a liberal 
welfare state. Furthermore, other features of a conservative pension scheme are challenged: the 
income maintenance is decreased by the new indexation formula, the corporatist governance 
model has changed, and survivors’ pensions were cut. The slender solidarity relying on 
corporatism is challenged by the introduction of a new private pension scheme, albeit only to a 
small degree due to the currently still low importance of the private pillar. Therefore, one could 
argue that a first move towards a liberal pension scheme can be observed, although up to now this 
shift has not been reflected in substantial changes, but rather manifests in a change of ideas.  
 
                                                 
9 The conservative welfare state has the following features: It is traditionally relying on the historical legacy of 
Catholic social policy, on corporatism and on etatism. The decommodification level is moderate. In regard to 
stratification, the state provides for income maintenance related to the former individual position on the labour 
market, which implies a slender solidarity also based on corporatism. Furthermore, in order to preserve traditional 
family structures, conservative welfare states discourage employment of married women and emphasise subsidiarity. 
It is transfer-intensive, but not service-intensive. (Esping-Andersen 1990, Arts et al. 2002) 
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A shift towards a liberal welfare state of course implies trade-offs. Advantages can be foreseen in 
the fields of financial sustainability and contribution rates. Disadvantages, such as decreasing 
social inclusion and increasing old-age poverty, can also be expected. The number and size of 
private pension plans will lag behind due to insufficient information (Boeri et al. 2002, Börsch-
Supan 2002) and little participation of low income earners who might not be able to bear the 
additional burden. In 2002, only 2 million out of the 35 million persons eligible undertook private 
pension savings. Furthermore, the losers of the 2001 reform – women and low income earners – 
are subgroups which are also oftentimes disadvantaged in liberal welfare states (Ginn et al. 2007, 
Essig et al. 2004, Hinrichs 2006, Schmähl 2003).  
 
6. Conclusions: New Politics of the Welfare State? 
The reforms undertaken by the Kohl and by the Schröder government broke with the main 
characteristics of the German pension system. These characteristics - standard of living 
maintenance, high replacement rates, paritätische Finanzierung and the male breadwinner model 
– were all challenged. At the same time, other factors, such as low contribution rates, were 
emphasised. The third pillar of private pensions was re-defined and strengthened, which 
constitutes a shift from public security towards private security.  
 
In part 5 of this paper, I have shown that, over time, (1) the way of decision-making changed: 
parties no longer search for inter-party consensus in the field of pension policies and therefore 
increasingly need to take electoral groups into account; the role of the social partners diminished; 
the influence and the number of “social politicians” decreased; and the actor constellation 
diversified by the introduction of new actors. Secondly (2), the outlined change of the system 
according to my analysis can be classified as a policy paradigm change in the way described by 
Hall (1993). Over time, social goals and ideas were re-balanced. (3) In the last part, I showed 
that, in light of Esping-Andersen’s (1990) welfare typology, the conservative pension system is 
moving towards a liberal pension scheme, although this shift is up to now not too substantial, but 
rather manifested in ideas. The role of decommodification changed substantially, stratification 
points to a liberal direction, and fundamental features of the conservative pension scheme – 
income maintenance, corporatist governance, survivors’ pensions – are challenged.  
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“Social policy is a process that unfolds over time” (Pierson 1996: 179). Coming back to the 
question of whether there is a new politics of welfare, my analysis shows that there has been a 
shift. It might not yet be very radical in a substantial way, but surely constitutes a substantial 
break with ideas. A new path of welfare has been entered.  
 16
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